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THE BURGER COURT AND THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE: A RETURN TO THE FAIR TRIAL RULE
INTRODUCTION

To no one's surprise, the four justices President Nixon
appointed to the United States Supreme Court have brought the
criminal justice revolution of the 1960's to an abrupt halt.
There were already strong indications by the middle of 1970,
when Chief Justice Burger had been sitting for a year and Justice Blackmun had just been appointed, that the new Court
seemed inclined toward restricting the Warren Court decisions
in the area of criminal procedure. This inclination developed into
implicit policy after Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined the
Court at the end of 1971, and the retreat from the landmark
cases of the Sixties is now well under way.1
Since 1970 the new Court has limited the letter or the spirit
of a number of the protections afforded defendants in criminal
proceedings. In the area of the privilege against self-incrimination, for instance, the Court has held that confessions taken in
the absence of the Miranda warnings may nonetheless be used
for impeachment (Harrisv. New York 2) ; that drivers involved
in automobile accidents may be required to stop at the scene and
give their names and addresses (Californiav. Byers3 ) ; and that
use-and-derivative-use immunity satisfies the privilege (Kastigar
v. United States4). In the area of identification, the Court has
held that the Wade-Gilbert right to counsel at lineups does not
arise until after the initiation of "adversary judicial criminal
proceedings" (Kirby v. Illinois5 ) ; that showing to witnesses
photographs of the defendant is not a "critical stage" and
thus does not give the defendant the right to have his counsel present (United States v. Ash6 ); and that a showup conducted seven months after the crime did not violate the Stovall
"unnecessarily suggestive" rule (Neil v. Biggers7 ). The Court
has also held that the Brady rule requiring the prosecution
to disclose evidence favorable to the accused did not apply
in a case where the prosecution failed to disclose information
I The four Nixon appointees command a majority with the concurrence
of either one of the "swing" justices, White or Stewart. The libertarian
wing of the Court has been reduced to three justices - Douglas, Brennan
and Marshall.
2401 U.S. 222 (1971).
3402 U.S. 424 (1971).
4 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
5 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
6413 U.S. 300 (1973).
7 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
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casting substantial doubt on the identification testimony of a
chief prosecution witness (Moore v. Illinois") ; that a person can
give a valid consent to a search without knowing he has the
right to refuse such consent (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte);
that a jury verdict need not be unanimous (Johnson v. Louisiana,10 Apodaca v. Oregon") ; that the determination of the
voluntariness of a confession need only be by a preponderance
of the evidence (Lego v. Twomey12) ; and that the guarantee
against double jeopardy did not bar reindictment and trial after
a mistrial had been declared because of a faulty first indictment,
even though the jury had already been empaneled and sworn
(Illinois v. Somerville"s).
It is clear, however, that the Burger Court has chosen to
eliminate many of the Warren Court decisions without taking the
judicially distasteful step of explicitly overruling them. It has
done this by employing the same type of due process test which
characterized the "Fair Trial Rule" applied by the Court during
the first half of this century.
The Fair Trial Rule rejected the doctrine that the Bill of
Rights applies to state proceedings, and restricted application of
the Due Process Clause to a case-by-case determination of
whether the proceedings in question were fundamentally "unfair." This approach was eventually discredited by the Warren
Court, which incorporated most of the Bill of Rights into the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and held them to
be equally applicable in state and federal proceedings.
The new Court's attempt to resurrect the straight due
process approach of the Fair Trial Rule, as well as its general
dissatisfaction with the expansive reading given by the Warren
Court to the criminal protections of the Bill of Rights, can
be seen most clearly by analyzing its treatment of the Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation - a right whose contours
were largely developed by the Warren Court.
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE UNDER THE WARREN COURT

The modern history of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation' began in 1965 with Pointer v. Texas.1 The prose8 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
9 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
10 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
11406 U.S. 404 (1972).
12404 U.S. 477 (1972).
"3410 U.S. 458 (1973).
14 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjo
the right
to be confronted with the witnesses against him....
U.. Const. amend.

VI.

5 380 U.S. 400 (1965).

Significant earlier cases include Reynolds v.
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cution in Pointer, after proving that one of its witnesses had
moved out of the state, introduced at the trial testimony which
had been given by the absent witness at the defendant's preliminary hearing. Pointer had not been represented by a lawyer at
the preliminary hearing and had not cross-examined the witness.
The Supreme Court first held that the right of confrontation was incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment:
[T]he Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to confront the
witnesses against him is . . . a fundamental right and 16is made
obligatory on the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court then pointed out that the right of cross-examination was included in the right of confrontation,' 17 and held
that the introduction of the preliminary hearing testimony at
the trial without such cross-examination denied the defendant
the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. 8
In the companion case of Douglas v. Alabama,1 an out-ofcourt confession of the accused's alleged accomplice, who had
been tried separately, was read into evidence in a purported
effort to refresh the witness' recollection. The statements incriminated both the accused and the witness, who refused to
answer in spite of the trial court's ruling that he could not assert
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
The Court held that:
Although the Solicitor's reading of [witness] Loyd's alleged
statement, and Loyd's refusals to answer, were *not technically
testimony, the Solicitor's reading may well have been the equivalent in the jury's mind of testimony that Loyd in fact made the
statement; and Loyd's reliance upon the privilege created a situation in which the jury might improperly infer both that the
statement had been made and that it was true . . . . Since the
Solicitor was not a witness, the inference from his reading that
Loyd made the statement could not be tested by cross-examination.
Similarly, Loyd could not be cross-examined
on a statement
20
imputed to but not admitted by him.
The Court also noted that cross-examination of the law
enforcement officer who took the statements from Loyd would
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), holding that a defendant who had himself
caused the absence of a witness could not complain of a Confrontation Clause
violation; Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900), holding that absence

of a witness due to the negligence of officers of the government was a
violation of the accused's right of confrontation; Mattox v. United States,
146 U.S. 140 (1892), stating in dictum that dying declarations are admissible

against the accused; and Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895),

allowing testimony given at defendant's first trial to be admitted at retrial,
the witness having died in the meantime. See also Delaney v. United States,
263 U.S. 586 (1924), discussed in note 84 inf!ra.
16 380 U.S. at 403.
:1 Id. at 404.
18 d. at 407-08.

19 380 U.S. 415 (1965).
20 Id. at 419.

A Return to the Fair Trial Rule

19731

not obviate the need to cross-examine Loyd himself, since the
officers could only testify that Loyd made the statements, and
not whether they were true. 1
The Warren Court thus held, in the first two cases applying
the Confrontation Clause to the states, that cross-examination
was a basic part of the right of confrontation, that former testimony which had not been subjected to cross-examination could
not be used at a defendant's trial, and that statements untested
by cross-examination could not be brought to the jury's attention,
whether or not they were technically part of the evidence in the
case.
The following year, in Brookhart v. Janis2 2 the Court considered the standard to be applied in testing whether a waiver
of the right of confrontation had been made, and concluded that
such a waiver must meet the same high standards set forth in
Johnson v. Zerbst 23 for the waiver of other constitutional rights
that it be "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
' 24
known right or privilege.
In Brookhart, the defendant's lawyer agreed to an unusual
Ohio procedure which had the practical effect of a plea of guilty.
Under this procedure, the defense counsel agreed that the prosecution need only present a prima facie case, with the understanding that he would not offer evidence himself on behalf of
the defendant nor cross-examine the state's witnesses. The state
introduced an alleged confession made out of court by one of
Brookhart's codefendants, who did not testify. The Court held
that the defendant's assertion that he was in no way pleading
guilty indicated that a waiver had not been made, and that the
denial of cross-examination and the introduction of the codefendant's out-of-court confession therefore violated his right of
confrontation.
In that same year the Court expanded the confrontation
right to include out-of-court remarks not subsequently admitted
into evidence. In Parker v. Gladden,2 the Court held in a per
21 Id. at 419-20.
22 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
23304 U.S. 458 (1938).
24 The Brookhart Court stated that:

The question of a waiver of a federally guaranteed constitutional right
is, of course, a federal question controlled by federal law. There is a
presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights . . . and for a

waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was 'an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464..

384 U.S. at 4.

The Court later held that a defendant who acts in a disruptive manner

may lose his confrontation right to be present at the trial, notwithstanding
the Johnson v. Zerbst standard for waiver. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337,
343 (1970).
22385 U.S. 363 (1966).
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curiam opinion that a bailiff's prejudicial remarks to a sequestered jury violated the defendant's right of confrontation, inasmuch as the statements were made outside the courtroom and
thus were not subject to cross-examination.26
In 1968 the Court extended the Pointer rule of excluding
prior testimony by an out-of-court witness to include those cases
where the defendant had been represented by counsel at the
earlier proceeding and had had an opportunity to cross-examine
the witness. In Barber v. Page,2 7 the prosecution read into evidence the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness who was
incarcerated in a federal prison in a neighboring state at the
time of the trial. The defendant had been represented by counsel
at the preliminary hearing, although no cross-examination of
the witness had taken place.
After noting that the state had made no effort to secure
the witness' presence at the trial, the Court held that unless the
state had made such an effort, the witness could not be considered
"unavailable" for purposes of introducing his earlier testimony. 28
Speaking for the Court, Justice Marshall declared that even if
the defendant's counsel had cross-examined the witness at the
preliminary hearing, his testimony could not be admitted at the
trial:
The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes
both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the
jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness. A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits
of a case than a trial, simply because its function is the more
limited one of determining whether probable cause exists to hold
the accused for trial. While there may be some justification for
holding that the opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at
a preliminary hearing satisfies the demands of the confrontation
clause where the witness is shown to be actually
unavailable, this
29
is not, as we have pointed out, such a case.
Barberv. Page thus emphasized the Warren Court's position
that the right to cross-examine at the trial itself was paramount,
and established the rule that in order to introduce the former testimony of an absent witness at the trial, there must have been
both an opportunity for cross-examination at the earlier hearing
and a good-faith effort on the part of the state to produce the
witness. The following year the Court held in Berger v. California3° that Barber was to have retroactive effect, noting that the
state's claim of reliance on previous standards was "most unpersuasive" since "Barber v. Page was clearly foreshadowed, if not
26

Id. at 364.

27 390 U.S. 719
28 Id. at 724-25.

(1968).

29 Id. at 725-26.
20

393 U.S. 314 (1969).
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preordained, by the Court's decision in Pointer v. Texas....
In the same year as the Barber decision the Court decided
Bruton v. United States, 32 a case which has had great impact on
the admission of evidence in joint trials. Bruton set forth the
rule that limiting instructions to the jury could not cure the
error of admitting out-of-court statements of a codefendant
which inculpate the accused, if the codefendant does not take the
stand.3 3 The Court held that "this encroachment on the right to
confrontation" was too damaging to be cured by an instruction
to the jury to disregard the statements insofar as they inculpated the defendant. 34 The Court relied heavily on the reasoning
in Jackson v. Denno,3 5 which held that a jury could not be expected to ignore a defendant's confession in determining guilt,
even if it found the confession to be involuntary and had been
instructed to disregard such a confession. Justice Brennan,
speaking for the Court in Bruton, pointed out that even a subterfuge such as that used by the prosecution in Douglas v. Alabama was less damaging to a defendant than was the introduction
of the statements made by Bruton's codefendant:
Here [codefendant] Evans' oral confessions were in fact testified
to, and were therefore actually in evidence. That testimony was
legitimate evidence against Evans and to that extent was properly
before the jury during its deliberations. Even greater, then, was
the likelihood that the jury would believe Evans made the statements and that they were true - not just the self-incriminating
portions but those implicating petitioner as well. Plainly, the
introduction of Evans' confession added substantial, perhaps even
critical, weight to the Government's case in a form not subject to
cross-examination, since Evans did not take the stand. Petitioner
thus was denied his constitutional right of confrontation. 38
Soon after the Bruton decision the Court held, in Roberts
v. Russell,3 T that the Bruton rule was to have retroactive effect.
In that same year the Court once again stressed the importance
of cross-examination, holding in Smith v. Illinois" that a trial
court's .refusal to allow the defense to learn the real name of the
3Id.
at 315. For discussion of the factors to be weighed in determining
whether a decision should be retroactive, see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965) and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). Stovall identified the
factors as:

(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of
the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and
(c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.
Id. at 297.
32

391 U.S. 123 (1968).

33
3 Id. at 126.

4Id. at 128.

35 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
86 391 U.S. at 127-28.
37392 U.S. 293 (1968).
88390 U.S. 129 (1968).
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prosecution's principal witness violated the defendant's right of
confrontation.
Foreclosing that avenue of information, the
Court stated, was "effectively to emasculate the right of crossexamination itself."'
While the year 1968 thus marked the high point in explication and extension of the Confrontation Clause, it proved to be
the last year the Court was to take such an expansive approach.
Chief Justice Burger was appointed in 1969, followed a year
later by Justice Blackmun. The new Court soon began to demonstrate its dissatisfaction with the landmark cases of Pointer,
Barber and Bruton.
THE BURGER COURT AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

The Court first turned its attention to the Bruton rule,
cutting back its protections partly by an extensive application of
the "harmless error" doctrine, and partly by upholding the sufficiency of limiting instructions in a joint trial where the codefendant takes the stand. The first Bruton "harmless error" case,
Harringtonv. California,40 had been decided three weeks before
Justice Burger was sworn in. It purported to apply the Chapman v. California41 rule that a federal constitutional error would
not be considered harmless unless the prosecution showed it to be
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ' 42 In Harrington confessions of the petitioner's three codefendants, two of whom did not
take the stand, were introduced with the limiting instruction held
to be inadequate in Bruton. The Court noted that the confessions
of the two codefendants who did not take the stand merely
placed Harrington at the scene of the crime, that Harrington
himself had made several damaging admissions to that effect, and
that several other witnesses testified he had been an active participant in the attempted robbery and murder. The Court concluded that under these circumstances the violations of Bruton
' 43
were "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Justice Brennan, in a dissent joined by Chief Justite Warren and Justice Marshall, pointed out that the testimony of the
three witnesses who had testified to Harrington's actual participation had been impeached, thus raising the possibility that the
less self-serving, improperly admitted confessions might have
tipped the balance in favor of conviction. The existence of such
a possibility, Justice Brennan argued, demonstrated that the
3' Id. at 131.
40 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
41386 U.S. 18 (1967).
42

Id. at 24.

43 395 U.S. at 254.
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state had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
44
was harmless.
The first Burger Court "harmless error" case, Schneble v.
Florida,45 involved an even more questionable use of the doctrine
than that employed in Harrington. In Schneble the trial court
permitted an investigating officer to testify to statements made by
petitioner's codefendant, who did not take the stand. The codefendant's statements contradicted the petitioner's version of events
as he had first recounted them to the police, although that version
was subsequently repudiated in the petitioner's out-of-court
confession. The Court, which did not consider the propriety of
admitting the petitioner's confession because it had limited the
grant of certiorari to the Bruton issue, held that the confession
provided such overwhelming evidence of guilt that the improperly
admitted statements of the codefendant amounted to no more
than "harmless error". 6
Justices Marshall, Douglas and Brennan argued in dissent
that the jury might well have based its conviction in large part
on the unconstitutionally admitted statements of the codefendant, since it had been instructed to disregard the petitioner's
confession if it found it to be involuntary. Justice Marshall
concluded:
In light of these uncertainties I find it impossible to perceive
how the Court can conclude that the violation of Bruton was harmless error. . . . Unless the Court intends to emasculate Bruton
... or to overrule Chapman v. California 47.. .sub silentio, then I
submit that its decision is clearly wrong.
In a third Bruton "harmless error" case, Brown v. United
States,48 photographs of the crime in progress and testimony
from a number of witnesses were introduced in evidence in
addition to improperly admitted statements made by a codefendant who did not take'the stand. Chief Justice Burger, speaking
for a unanimous Court, held that the erroneously admitted testimony was "merely cumulative of other overwhelming and largely
'
uncontroverted evidence properly before the jury." 4
These three cases make it clear that the Court will sanction
Bruton violations so long as a plausible "harmless error" argument can be made. As the dissenting justices in Harringtonand
Schneble illustrated, it is doubtful that at least those two cases
44Id. at 257.
45 405 U.S. 427

(1972).

Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the opinion for the majority, was reluctant even to acknowledge that there had been a Bruton violation, stating
"we find that any violation of Bruton that may have occurred at petitioner's
trial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 428.
47 Id. at 437.
48 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
49 Id. at 231.
46
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were actually consonant with the Chapman standard of "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." These decisions have given
lower courts the cue that little more is needed to sustain convictions procured in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights
50
than to attach a "harmless error" label to the violations.
A second path of retreat from Bruton was taken in Nelson
v. O'Neil,51 a 1971 case in which the Court held that if a
codefendant takes the stand and testifies favorably to the accused,
the admission into evidence of statements allegedly made by him
inculpating the accused does not violate the latter's right of
confrontation. In that case, a policeman testified for the prosecution that O'Neil's codefendant, Runnels, had made an unsworn
oral statement implicating himself and O'Neil. As required
under California law, the trial judge instructed the jury that the
statement could be considered only against Runnels. Both defendants then took the stand and testified by way of alibi that
they were together at O'Neil's home at the time the crimes in
question were committed. Runnels also testified that he had not
made the statement attributed to him by the policeman.
Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court, held that since
O'Neil's codefendant had taken the stand and was available for
cross-examination by O'Neil as well as by the prosecution, no
Bruton violation had occurred:
It was clear in Bruton that the 'confrontation' guaranteed by
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is confrontation at trial
that is, that the absence of the defendant at the time the codefendant allegedly made the out-of-court statement is immaterial,
the declarant can be cross-examined on the witness stand
so long as
52
at trial.
Justices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall dissented, contending that the majority had ignored the real issue. Justice Brennan noted that at the time of the trial, California did not permit
admissions made to a police officer after an arrest to be used
against other defendants, whether or not the declarant testified at
He argued that the real question was, therefore,
trial."
whether California, having determined for whatever reason that
the statement involved in this case was inadmissible against respondent, may nevertheless present the statement to the jury that
was to decide respondent's guilt, and instruct that jury that it
50 An illustration of the extremes to which a court will go in finding

"harmless error" is found in State v. Camerlin, 108 R.I. 524, 277 A.2d 291
In that case the former
(1971) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1022 (1972).
wife of Camerlin's codefendant Souza testified that Souza told her he and

Camerlin had committed the murder of a liquor store operator, describing
events that corroborated the version of an eyewitness. The court conceded
that the admission of the out-of-court statement of Camerlin's codefendant
violated the Bruton rule - but held it was only "harmless error"!
51402 U.S. 622 (1971).
52 Id. at 626.
5 Id. at 632.
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should not be considered against respondent. I think our cases
compel the conclusion that it may not. 5'Although the Burger Court has clearly been chipping away
at the Bruton rule whenever possible, it has left untouched the
core of the rule. Statements of a codefendant which inculpate
the accused still cannot be admitted into evidence when the
codefendant does not take the stand. The Court's treatment of
the Pointer and Barber doctrines, however, has been far more
devastating, for it has undercut the basic rationales of those
decisions.
In the 1972 case, Mancusi v. Stubbs," the Burger Court
eased the burden placed on the prosecution in Barber. In Stubbs
the state read into evidence at the defendant's second trial the
testimony given at the first trial by a witness who had moved to
Sweden in the interim. The Court held there had been no Confrontation Clause violation, noting that since the witness had
moved out of the country, he was beyond the reach of the State

of Tennessee26
In a dissent joined by Justice Douglas, Justice Marshall
pointed out that the state had "made absolutely no effort" to
secure the witness' presence at the second trial, 57 and contended
that this clearly violated the rule in Barber:
In that case [Barber], the claim was made that the Court had no
power to compel the absent witness to appear. We held that
nevertheless the State was obliged to make a good-faith effort to
secure his appearance, for 'the possibility of a refusal is not the
equivalent of asking and receiving a rebuff.'"8

Stubbs, although a clear retreat from Barber, presumably is
limited to situations where the witnesses are beyond the reach of
the trial court. The case should thus have little effect on future
proceedings, since the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of
Witnesses from without a state and the availability of state and
federal writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum59 effectively
limit the jurisdictional unavailability of witnesses to those
living abroad.
Far more significant than Stubbs are two 1970 confrontation
cases, Californiav. Green"° and Dutton v. Evans.6 1 These cases
take several giant steps backward from the Warren Court
confrontation decisions, leaving substantial confusion as to the
present scope of the confrontation right in the process.
54 Id. at 633.
55408 U.S. 204 (1972).
56 Id. at 212.
57 Id. at 220.

58 Id. at 221.

59 See id. at 212.

60 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
61400 U.S. 74 (1970).
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Californiav. Green
California v. Green involved the introduction at trial of a
witness' earlier statements after the witness, Melvin Porter,
testified that he had been under the influence of LSD at the time
of the incident in question and therefore could not remember
what had happened.2 These statements consisted of out-of-court
remarks made to a police officer and testimony given at the
defendant's preliminary hearing - both of which were admitted
under a provision of the California Evidence Code permitting
prior inconsistent statements to be admitted for the truth of the
63
matter contained therein, rather than for impeachment.
The Supreme Court held that the out-of-court statement was
properly admitted if the declarant could be considered available
at the trial and subject to cross-examination. 64 Further, the
preliminary hearing testimony, inasmuch as it was subject to
contemporaneous cross-examination, was held to have been
properly admitted whether the witness was considered available
or unavailable, provided that in the latter case the state had made
a good-faith effort to produce him.65

The Court remanded the

case to the California Supreme Court66 for a determination of
whether Porter's claimed lack of memory made him unavailable,
and if so whether the admission of the statement made to the
62 The witness was a minor who named the accused as his supplier after
being arrested for selling marihuana to an undercover police officer. 399
U.S. at 151-52.
63 Id. at 151, 152.
A similar rule was adopted in the Federal Rules of
Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates sent by the U.S.
Supreme Court to Congress on November 20, 1972. 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972).
(Now stayed by Pub. L. No. 93-12 (Mar. 30, 1973)). Rule 801(d) (1) (A)
read:
A statement is not hearsay if - (1) Prior statement by witness.
The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to crossexamination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony ...
The Advisory Committee Note remarked that the constitutionality of
the provision had been upheld in California v. Green. 56 F.R.D. at 296.
Following the stay of the Rules, the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Criminal Justice drafted a revised version, which was further
amended by the House Committee on the Judiciary. (This version passed
the House on February 6, 1974 with floor amendments not affecting the
provisions cited in this article. The bill was referred on February 7, 1974
to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.) Rule 801(d) (1) (A) now reads:
A statement is not hearsay if - (1) Prior statement by witness.
- The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to crossexamination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony and was given under oath subject to
cross-examination, and subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial or
hearing or in a deposition. ...
H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 15, 1973).
64 399 U.S. at 164.
65 Id. at 165.
66 The California Supreme Court had affirmed a lower court's reversal
of the conviction on the ground the Confrontation Clause had been violated
by admission of the out-of-court statements for the truth of the matter
contained therein. Id. at 153.
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police officer was harmless error in light of the Court's holding
that the preliminary hearing testimony was not barred. 6
In the Court's majority opinion, Justice White observed
that the Confrontation Clause was originally designed to prevent
the use of depositions and ex parte affidavits against criminal
defendants in lieu of cross-examination at trial.6s Therefore,
he reasoned, the lack of contemporaneous cross-examination of
an out-of-court statement is immaterial if the witness testifies
at the trial itself, since the cross-examination at the trial
would suffice to expose any discrepancies between the witness'
current testimony and his earlier statements.6 "
Notwithstanding the emphasis which Barber v. Page had
placed on the importance of cross-examination at the trial,-',
Justice White also held that Porter's preliminary hearing testimony would have been admissible under Barber even if the
witness were unavailable at the trial, so long as the state had
made a good-faith effort to produce him, since he had been subject
to cross-examination at the preliminary hearing.
Finally, Justice White raised the specter of a constitutionalization of the hearsay rule and its exceptions via the Confrontation Clause:
The issue before us is . . . whether a defendant's constitutional
right 'to be confronted with the witnesses against him' is necessarily inconsistent with a State's decision to change its hearsay
rules to reflect the minority view described above [i.e., admitting
the out-of-court statements of the witness for the truth of the
matter contained therein, rather than for impeachment purposes.]
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, ET11 it is quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap
is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or
67 On remand, the California Supreme Court affirmed the conviction,
implicitly finding Porter to have been available. The court stated that
since at the trial Porter affirmed the earlier statements as his, the defendant's counsel had the opportunity to probe by cross-examination the
inconsistency between those statements and Porter's trial testimony. It is
of course clear that the statutory provision permitting introduction of prior
inconsistent statements for the truth of the matter contained therein presupposes availability, since otherwise there would be no trial testimony with
which prior statements could be inconsistent. The California Supreme Court
pointed out that "in normal circumstances" testimony by a witness that he
does not remember an event is not inconsistent with earlier statements
describing that event. But in this case, the court concluded, Porter's claimed
lack of memory was clearly an evasion and could therefore be taken as a
denial of the substance of his earlier statement. People v. Green, 3 Cal. 3d
981, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494, 479 P.2d 998 (1971), petition for cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 801 (1971).
68399 U.S. at 157-58.
69 Id. at 164.

See text accompanying note 29 supra.
White listed the following purposes of confrontation:
(1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding
against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces
7o

71 Justice
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less than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at common law.

Our decisions

have never established such a congruence .... 72
Justice Brennan dissented, contending that both the out-ofcourt statement and the preliminary hearing testimony were
improperly admitted. He pointed out that the witness' claimed
lack of memory clearly made him unavailable for cross-examination as to the truth of both the earlier statements,7 and argued
that introduction of the statements in such a case was no different in principle than the situation encountered in Douglas v.
Alabama,74 in which the Court had found a clear Confrontation
Clause violation:
For purposes of the Confrontation Clause, there is no signifi-

cant difference between a witness who fails to testify about an
alleged offense because he is unwilling to do so and a witness whose
silence is compelled by an inability to remember ....

in neither

instance are the purposes of the Confrontation Clause satisfied,
because the witness cannot be questioned at trial concerning the
pertinent facts. In both cases, if a pre-trial statement is introduced for the truth of the facts asserted, the witness becomes
simply a conduit for the admission of stale evidence, whose reliability can never be tested before the trial factfinder by cross-examination of the declarant about the operative events, and by
observation of his demeanor as he testifies about them.7 5
Justice Brennan also argued that cross-examination at the
preliminary hearing could not substitute for cross-examination
at the trial because, as Barber recognized, the purposes of the
two proceedings were vastly dissimilar. At the preliminary
hearing, Justice Brennan pointed out, the state need only establish probable cause, both parties are reluctant to disclose their
respective cases, the hearing occurs before either has had a
chance for much preparation, and the schedules of court and
counsel are not geared to lengthy preliminary hearing proceedings. There is therefore little probability that a thorough and
effective cross-examination would be made at a preliminary
the witness to submit to cross-examination, the 'greatest legal engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth' (5 Wigmore §1367) ; (3) per-

mits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus aiding the jury in
assessing his credibility.
399 U.S. at 158.
Compare Justice White's assessment of confrontation with this statement of the purpose of the hearsay rule:
[T~he Anglo-American tradition evolved three conditions under which
witnesses ordinarily will be required to testify: oath, personal presence
at the trial, and cross-examination. The rule against hearsay is designed to insure compliance with these ideal conditions, and when one of
them is absent the hearsay objection becomes pertinent.
C. McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 245, at 581-82 (2d ed. 1972).
72
73

399 U.S. at 155.

Id. at 193.

74 See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.

15 399 U.S. at 194.
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hearing. Furthermore, Justice Brennan noted, the introduction
of preliminary hearing testimony at the trial deprives the factfinder of the opportunity of observing the demeanor of the
6
witness as he answers the questions.1
Justice Brennan conceded that preliminary hearing testimony may be used if the witness cannot physically be produced
at the trial despite the state's good-faith efforts to do so. But he
distinguished these situations from those in which the witness
refuses to testify or claims he cannot remember, contending that
the out-of-court statements in the latter category are far more
77
likely to be unreliable.
Under the California v. Green ruling, courts are now free
to allow the introduction of a witness' preliminary hearing testimony at the trial as long as the witness takes the stand, regardless of whether he then testifies and regardless of the reasons for
a failure to do so. 78 The difficulty with this rule is apparent from
the illogic of Justice White's reasoning. If, on the one hand, Porter's claimed lack of memory is held to make him unavailable, his
earlier statements could not be tested by cross-examination at
the trial, as Justice White supposed. 71

On the other hand, if

Porter were held to be available, the very condition for permitting admission of his earlier statements -

unavailability -

fails.

Whichever position is taken, the rationale of the earlier Supreme
Court confrontation cases argues against admissibility. It seems
clear that the Burger Court majority in Green simply decided
at 196-98.
at 201-02:
Whether a witness' assertions are reliable ordinarily has little or no
bearing on their admissibility, for they are subject to the corrective
influences of his demeanor and cross-examination. If, however, there is
no possibility that his assertions can be so tested at trial, then their
reliability becomes an important factor in deciding whether to permit
their presentation to the factfinder.
761 d.

77Id.

Physical unavailability is generally a neutral factor; in most instances, it does not cast doubt on the witness' assertions. Inability to remember the pertinent events, on the other hand, or unwillingness to testify about them, whether because of feigned loss of
memory or fear of self-incrimination, does cast such doubt. Honest
inability to remember at trial raises serious questions about clarity of
memory at the time of the pretrial statement. The deceit inherent in
feigned loss of memory lessens confidence in the probity of prior
assertions. And fear of self-incrimination at trial suggests that the
witness may have shaped prior testimony so as to avoid dangerous
consequences for himself. Reliability cannot be assumed simply because
a prior statement was made at a preliminary hearing.
78 Id. at 167-68:
[The state] produced Porter at trial, swore him as a witness, and tendered him for cross-examination. Whether Porter then testified in a
manner consistent or inconsistent with his preliminary hearing testimony, claimed a loss of memory claimed his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, or simply refused to answer, nothing in the
Confrontation Clause prohibited the State from also relying on his prior
testimony to prove its case against Green.
7 Id. at 166-68.
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that the Confrontation Clause had been extended too far, and,
while paying lip service to the Warren Court decisions, ignored
the rationale of those decisions in an effort to restrict the scope
of the confrontation right.
Dutton v. Evans
Shortly after California v. Green, the Court took the opportunity to consider the constitutionality of an even more extreme
use of an out-of-court statement, and again failed to find any
Confrontation Clause violation. In Dutton v. Evans,8" a prison
inmate by the name of Shaw testified at the trial that while in
prison he had heard defendant Evans' alleged accomplice, Venson
Williams, remark, "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch
Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this now."81 Although Williams
did not testify at the trial, Shaw's testimony was admitted under
a Georgia statute making declarations of one conspirator admissible against all, even in the concealment phase of the conspiracy. 2 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
the introduction of this statement violated Evans' Sixth Amend8 3
ment right of confrontation.
In a four-one-four plurality decision, the Supreme Court
reversed the Court of Appeals. Justice Stewart wrote the lead
opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Blackmun and White. Justice Blackmun, joined by the Chief
Justice, also appended a brief concurring opinion, while Justice
Harlan wrote an opinion concurring in the result. Justice
Marshall was joined in dissent by Justices Black, Douglas and
4
Brennan.
Justice Stewart, proceeding from the seemingly neutral
proposition that the Confrontation Clause is not coextensive
with the hearsay rule, concluded that Georgia's statutory exception to the hearsay rule did not violate the Confrontation Clause
under the facts of the case, since there were present "indicia of
80

400 U.S. 74 (1970).

81 Id. at 77.
82

Id. at 78.

83 Id. at 76.

84 None of the four Supreme Court opinions in the Dutton case approached the problem by analyzing the theory behind the admission of
out-of-court statements made by coconspirators. The Court could have
reached a more satisfactory result if it had treated the question as one of
determining whether Williams' statement was made in the course of his
criminal agency and therefore to be regarded as the constructive act or
admission of the defendant. If it were so made there would be no violation
of the defendant's right to confront the witness against him, since Williams'
act or statement would be equivalent to an act or admission made by the
defendant himself. Under this analysis, Williams' remark cannot be admitted against Evans without confrontation, since it was clearly not made
in the course of the criminal agency.
It is quite possible, of course, to go one step further and say that even
those out-of-court statements which are made in furtherance of the con-
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reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of
whether a statement may be placed before the jury though there
is no confrontation of the declarant." '
Citing California 9).
Green, he declared:
The decisions of this Court make it clear that the mission of
the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for the
accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials by
spiracy violate the Confrontation Clause, inasmuch as the agency theory
of conspiracy law is little more than a fiction designed to admit hearsay
statements.
A number of Circuits have re-examined the federal conspiracy rules of
evidence in light of the recent Supreme Court Confrontation Clause cases.
Parness v. United States, 415 F.2d 346 (3d Cir. 1969), Campbell v.
United States, 415 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1969), and United States v. Lawler,
413 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1046 (1970), all held
that admission of a coconspirator's out-of-court statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy do not violate the Brnton rule. United States v.
American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corporation, 433 F.2d 174 (3d
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971), held that California v. Green
did not alter the court's conclusion in Parness that such statements do not

require confrontation.

United States v. Fischetti, 450 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1016 (1972), interpreted Dutton as holding that out-of-court statements made by a coconspirator after the conspiracy had ended do not
violate the Confrontation Clause. United States v. Weber, 437 F.2d 327
(3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971) ; United States v. Clayton,
450 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 975 (1972) ; and United
States v. Cerone, 452 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964
(1972), all concluded that, in light of Dutton, out-of-court statements of a
coconspirator made in furtherance of the conspiracy do not violate the
defendant's right of confrontation.
However, United States v. Adams, 446 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 943 (1971), and United States v. Puco, 476 F.2d 1099
(2d Cir. 1973), cert denied, __ U.S. .
94 S. Ct. 106 (1973), both concluded that since Dutton and Green emphasized that the hearsay rule and
the Confrontation Clause are not equivalent, it could not be assumed that the
coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule necessarily conformed to the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause. The two courts decided that each
case had to be individually considered to determine whether the out-of-court
statements bore "sufficient indicia of reliability," 476 F.2d 1099, 1107, and
afforded the trier of fact an adequate basis for evaluating the truth of the
declarations. 476 F.2d at 1107; 446 F.2d 681, 683.
Although the Supreme Court decided in 1924 that the out-of-court
statement of a dead coconspirator made during the progress of the conspiracy did not violate the defendant's right of confrontation, Delaney v.
United States, 263 U.S. 586, 590, there has been no recent consideration by
the Court of the conspiracy-confrontation question. Justice Douglas indicated in a dissent to the denial of certiorari in Addonizio v. United States,
405 U.S. 936 (1972), that he would have liked to consider "whether the
extensive reliance by the prosecutor on the coconspirator exception to the
hearsay rule . . . deprived these petitioners of constitutional rights [including the right to confrontation]." Id. at 944.
85 400 U.S. at 89. These "indicia of reliability" Justice Stewart identified as:
First, the statement contained no express assertion about past fact,
and consequently it carried on its face a warning to the jury against
giving the statement undue weight. Second, Williams' personal knowledge of the identity and role of the other participants in the triple
murder is abundantly established by [accomplice] Truett's testimony
and by Williams' prior conviction. It is inconceivable that cross-examination could have shown that Williams was not in a position to know
whether or not Evans was involved in the murder. Third, the possibility that Williams' statement was founded on faulty recollection is
remote in the extreme. Fourth, the circumstances under which Williams
made the statement were such as to give reason to suppose that
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assuring that '"the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for
evaluating the truth of the prior statement." California v. Green.
.'
Evans exercised, and exercised effectively, his right to confrontation on the factual question whether Shaw had actually
heard Williams make the statement Shaw related. And the possibility that cross-examination of Williams could conceivably have
shown the jury that the statement, though made, might have been
unreliable was wholly unreal. 8o

Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, thought the
conviction should be sustained for a reason seemingly incompatible with that of Justice Stewart. The circumstances surrounding the making of the alleged statement, Justice Blackmun concluded, were so unbelievable that Shaw's testimony could not
have helped the prosecution's case, and admission of the statement was, at the worst, "harmless error."8 7
Justice Harlan concurred in the result on the ground that
admission of the out-of-court statement did not deprive Evans of
his due process right to a "fair trial." He contended that a fair
trial standard, rather than the Confrontation Clause, should be
used in analyzing evidentiary questions arising under the hearsay
rule:
Regardless of the interpretation one puts on the words of the
Williams did not misrepresent Evans' involvement in the crime. These
circumstances go beyond a showing that Williams had no apparent
reason to lie to Shaw. His statement was spontaneous, and it was
against his penal interest to make it.
Id.at 88-89.
The phrase "indicia of reliability" was also used in California v. Green,
399 U.S. at 161-62, but in explanation of the cases in which out-of-court
statements of an unavailable declarant were said to be admissible if there
had been prior cross-examination and a good faith effort by the prosecution
to produce the witness. In Dutton there was neither. Justice Stewart
remarked that Evans himself could have subpoenaed Williams if he had
wanted to test the truth of his statement, 400 U.S. at 88 n. 19, ignoring the
Barber v. Page requirement that the burden is on the prosecution to produce,
or make a good faith effort to produce, the witnesses against the accused.
See the dissent's comment to this effect, Id. at 102 n. 4.
It is interesting to note that in spite of his finding of "indicia of reliability," Justice Stewart thought the defense cross-examination of Shaw "was
such as to cast doubt on Shaw's credibility and, more particularly, on whether
the conversation which Shaw related ever took place." Id. at 87 n. 18.
s8Id.at 89. Compare "indicia of reliability" with thetest for admission
of hearsay under Rule 804(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence for the
United States Courts and Magistrates sent by the Court to Congress on
November 20, 1972. 56 F.R.D. 183, 322 (1972).
(Now stayed by Pub. L.
No. 93-12 (Mar. 30, 1973). Rule 804 covered "Hearsay Exceptions: Declarant Unavailable," and subsection (b) (6) read:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness: . ..A statement not specifically covered by
any of the foregoing exceptions but having comparable circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."
Following the stay of the Rules, the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Criminal Justice drafted a revised version, with subsequent
amendments in the House Committee on the Judiciary, in which Rule
804(b) (6) was deleted. H.R. 5463, 93rd Cong., lst'Sess. (Nov. 15, 1973).
(See note 63 supra for the current status of the Rules.)
87 400 U.S. at 90.
This conclusion is somewhat startling in light of the
fact that both Justice Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger joined in Justice
Stewart's opinion.
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Confrontation Clause, the clause is simply not well designed for
taking into account the numerous factors that must be weighed in
passing on the appropriateness of rules of evidence. The failure
of Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion to explain the standard by which
it tests Shaw's statement, or how this standard can be squared
with the seemingly absolute command of the clause, bears witness
to the fact that this clause is being set a task for which it is not
suited. The task is far more appropriately performed under the
aegis of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' commands that
federal and state trials, respectively, must be conducted in accordance with due process of law. It is by this standard that I
would test federal and state rules of evidence.,,
The four dissenting Justices in Dutton argued that the result
reached by the majority was wholly inconsistent with the earlier
Confrontation Clause decisions, in particular Douglas v. Alabama
and Bruton v. United States."" To Justice Marshall, the case
was one:
with all the unanswered questions that the confrontation of witnesses through cross-examination is meant to aid in answering:
What did the declarant say, and what did he mean, and was it the
truth? If Williams had testified and been cross-examined, Evans'
counsel could have fully explored these and other matters. The
jury then could have evaluated the statement in the light of Williams' testimony and demeanor. As it was, however, the State was
able to use Shaw to present the damaging evidence and thus to
avoid confronting Evans with the person who allegedly gave witness against him. I had thought that this was precisely what the
Confrontation Clause as applied to the States in Pointer and our
other cases prevented. 9
As to Justice Stewart's "indicia of reliability," the dissent
noted:
If 'indicia of reliability' are so easy to come by, and prove so
much, then it is only reasonable to ask whether the Confrontation
Clause has any independent vitality at all in protecting a criminal
defendant against the use of extrajudicial statements not subject
to cross-examination and not exposed to a jury assessment of the
declarant's demeanor at trial. I believe the Confrontation Clause
has been sunk if any out-of-court statement bearing an indicium of
a probative likelihood can come in, no matter how damaging the
statement may be or how great the need for the truth-discovering
test of cross-examination."1
It is clear from Dutton that by 1970 a majority of the
Court not only had become unwilling to carry the holdings of
earlier Supreme Court confrontation cases to their logical conclusion, but also was trying to avoid their application entirely by
substituting either an "indicia of reliability" test or a due process
approach. The due process approach of Justice Harlan is, of
Id. at 96-97.
89 Id. at 100.
90 Id. at 104.
91 Id. at 110.
88
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course, identical to the "Fair Trial Rule" applied by the Supreme
Court in the pre-Warren years. Under that rule, state proceedings could be scrutinized only for the purpose of determining
whether they had been fundamentally unfair, and thus in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
The Warren Court abandoned the Fair Trial Rule in favor
of selective incorporation, whereby explicit guarantees of the
Bill of Rights were held to be incorporated in the Fourteenth
Amendment and therefore applicable to the states. Justice
Harlan refused to go along with the Warren Court on this issue,
believing that selective incorporation was incompatible with a
federal system.9 2 Justice Harlan's approach in Dutton is clearly
consistent with his long standing disagreement with that Court
over its doctrine of selective incorporation in general and its
Confrontation Clause case law in particular. But the "indicia of
reliability" test applied in Dutton by Justice Stewart, despite his
labored effort to make the test seem consistent with the Warren
Court case law,9 3 is just as incompatible with the rationale of
those cases as is Justice Harlan's approach - and for a good
reason. For all practical purposes, the two tests are interchangeable: an out-of-court statement bearing indicia of reliability and thus admissible under the Stewart test would likewise
be held not to have deprived the defendant of a fair trial, and
24
thus would also be admissible under the Harlan standard.
The two tests are both unavoidably nebulous and subjective in
nature. Therefore, whether the Burger Court purports in the
future to apply the Stewart test or the Harlan test, it will in
practical effect be utilizing the once discarded Fair Trial Rule
of the pre-Warren years - and, in so doing, will be undercutting
the body of case law built up by the Warren Court interpretations
of the Confrontation Clause.
Chambers v. Mississippi
A 1973 decision implicitly applying the Harlan test illustrates how easily the Warren Court confrontation cases can be
avoided by means of the straight due process approach. In Chambers v. Mississippi,95 the majority opinion managed to discuss the
right of confrontation without a single mention of the Confrontation Clause; the defendant, said the Court, had a "due process"
92 See, e.g., his opinions in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14-33 (1964);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408-09 (1965) ; Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 171-93 (1968).
93 See 400 U.S. at 83-87.

.4 Compare "indicia of reliability" with Justice Harlan's wording of the
test he used in his concurring opinion in California v. Green: "whether this
conviction stands on such unreliable evidence that reversal is required."
399 U.S. at 189 (1970).
95 410 U.S. 284 (1973).

19731

1 Return to the Fair Trial Riule

right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. 96 This right turned
out not to resemble the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause

right at all.
The defendant in Chambers called as a witness at his trial
Gable McDonald, who had earlier given Chambers' lawyers a
sworn confession to the murder with which Chambers was
charged. On the stand McDonald denied any guilt and claimed
he gave the statement because he had been promised a share in
the proceeds of a lawsuit Chambers supposedly was to bring
against the town of Woodville, presumably for false arrest. The
trial court refused to allow Chambers to cross-examine McDonald
as an adverse witness because of a Mississippi common law rule
that a party may not impeach his own witness.9 7 The court also
refused to allow three other defense witnesses to testify that
McDonald had orally made out-of-court confessions to each of
them.9
This testimony was excluded as hearsay.9 1
In the Supreme Court, Chambers argued that the trial judge's
evidentiary rulings denied him due process. The Court agreed,
Id. at 294.
9 Id. at 295.
96

The trial court stated that "[h]e may be hostile, but he
is not adverse in the sense of the word, so your request will be overruled."
410 U.S. at 291. The Supreme Court of Mississippi, in affirming, remarked:
"McDonald's testimony was not adverse to appellant; it was merely in
McDonald's defense and in explanation of his rather unusual confession.
Nowhere did he point the finger at Chambers." Chambers v. State, 252 So.
2d 217, 220 (Miss. 1971).
08 The testimony of one witness was given in the jury's presence, with a
subsequent instruction from the court that it be disregarded. The testimony
of the other two witnesses was given out of the presence of the jury and
then ruled inadmissible. 410 U.S. at 292 n. 4.
99 The court sustained the state's objection as to two of the witnesses
on the ground the testimony was hearsay, but did not state its reason for
exclusion of the third witness' testimony. The state objected to this testimony on the ground that it was an attempt by Chambers to impeach one
The Mississippi Supreme Court conof his own witnesses (McDonald).
sidered the confessions to which the two witnesses had testified out of the
presence of the jury as hearsay, and did not discuss the testimony of the
other witness, which the trial court had directed the jury to disregard on
the basis of hearsay. 252 So. 2d at 220.
Since Chambers was prevented from cross-examining McDonald, there
was no need for McDonald to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. Had he done so, the question would have arisen as to
whether this made him "unavailable" for purposes of introducing hearsay
falling within any of the recognized exceptions. There is no consistent
position as to whether a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination
suffices to make a declarant unavailable.

C. MCCORMICK,

EVIDENCE

§ 280,

at 678-79 (2d ed. 1972). Under such a circumstance, McDonald's confessions
could be admitted in a jurisdiction recognizing declarations against penal
interest as an admissible exception to the hearsay rule. Most jurisdictions
do not (Id. § 278, at 673), including Mississippi. Brown v. State, 99 Miss.
The trend, however, is towards admitting such
719, 55 So. 961 (1911).
declarations. See the dissenting opinion in Chambers v. State, 252 So. 2d
at 220-21; People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825, 257 N.E.2d 16
(1970); People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841, 389 P.2d 377
(1964); People v. Lettrich, 413 Ill. 172, 108 N.E.2d 488 (1952) (limiting
departure from the usual rule against admission to those cases where
"justice demands" it, Id. at 178, 108 N.E.2d at 492). No confrontation
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but Justice Powell's majority opinion ° ° couched the Court's
holding in extremely limiting terms:
We conclude that the exclusion of this critical evidence [i.e.,
problem arises as to McDonald, of course, since he was not the accused.
The Court pointed out (410 U.S. at 299 & n. 18) that exclusion

would not be required under Rule 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 321 (1972),
sent by the Court to Congress on November 20, 1972 and now stayed by

Pub. L. No. 93-12 (Mar. 30, 1973). Rule 804(b) (4) provided that a statement against interest may be admitted if the declarant is unavailable (a
term including his exemption by the judge from testifying under a claim of
the Fifth Amendment privilege, and a simple refusal to answer despite an

order of the judge that he do so).
fined as:

"Statement against interest" was de-

A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary

to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to
subject him to civil or criminal liability or to render invalid a claim by
him against another or to make him an object of hatred, ridicule, or
disgrace, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement tending to
expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the
accused is not admissible unless corroborated.
The Advisory Committee's Note explained that the corroboration requirement was inserted to lessen the possibility "of fabrication either of the
fact of the making of the confession or in its contents". 56 F.R.D. at 327
This leaves the rule unclear as to how much corroboration would be needed,
and whether corroboration either of the making of the confession or of its
contents would be sufficient, or specifically one or the other, or, possibly,
both. Chambers indicated the Court would probably interpret corroboration
in this context to mean corroboration of the truth of the confession:
[E]ach one [of McDonald's out-of-court confessions] was corroborated
by some other evidence in the case - McDonald's sworn confession, the
testimony of an eyewitness to the shooting, the testimony that McDonald was seen with a gun immediately after the shooting, and proof of
his prior ownership of a .22-caliber revolver and subsequent purchase
of a new weapon. The sheer number of independent confessions provided additional corroboration for each.
410 U.S. at 300.
It is also noteworthy that hearsay against interest inculpating the
accused would not require corroboration under this rule. Whether such
inculpation violates the accused's right of confrontation was apparently to
have been left to the courts for resolution. The Committee's Note observed:
"The rule does not purport to deal with questions of the right of confrontation." 56 F.R.D. at 328.
The House of Representatives Subcommittee on Criminal Justice (see
notes 63 and 86 supra) revised Rule 804(b)(4) (now Rule 804(b) (3)) to
read:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to
the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to
subject him to criminal liability, that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.
A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
A statement or confession offered against the accused in a criminal case,
made by a codefendant or other person implicating both himself and the
accused, is not within this exception.
H.R. 5463, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 15, 1973).
The Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary explained that the
stiffer corroboration requirement was added to make it clear the accused's
own testimony would not be sufficient corroboration. The last sentence was
added, the Report stated, to codify the Bruton rule. H. R. Rep. No. 650, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1973).
100 Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground the Court did not have
jurisdiction, and he therefore did not discuss the constitutional issue. However, he remarked that "[wlere I to reach the merits in this case, I would
have considerable difficulty in subscribing to the Court's further constitu-
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the hearsay confession of McDonald], coupled with the State's
refusal to permit Chambers to cross-examine McDonald, denied him
a trial in-accord with traditional and fundamental standards of
due process. In reaching this judgment, we establish no new principles of constitutional law. Nor does our holding signal any
diminution in the respect traditionally accorded to the States in
the establishment and implementation of their own criminal trial
rules and procedures. Rather, we hold quite simply that under the
facts and circumstances of this case the rulings of the trial court
deprived Chambers of a fair trial.1ol

The Court thus completely ignored the Sixth Amendment
confrontation right and limited its analysis to the question of
whether, under the particular facts of the case, Chambers had had
6a fair trial." Although it is possible to argue that an accused's
Sixth Amendment right to be confronted with the witnesses
"against him" does not apply to witnesses called by the defendant, the Court itself rejected the idea that the right of crossexamination hinges on the circumstances of who calls the
witness:
The availability of the right to confront and to cross-examine
those who give damaging testimony against the accused has never
been held to depend on whether the witness was initially put on the
stand by the accused or by the State. We reject the notion that
a right of such substance in the criminal process may be governed
by that technicality or by any narrow and unrealistic definition of
tionalization of the intricacies of the common law of evidence." 410 U.S.
at 308.
Justice White concurred with the majority as to the merits, as well as
on its finding of jurisdiction. He devoted his entire opinion to a discussion
of the jurisdictional question, concluding:
In the circumstances before us, where there were repeated offers of
evidence and objections to its exclusion, although not on constitutional
grounds, where the matter was presented in federal due process terms
to the state supreme court and where the State does not now deny that
the issue was properly before the state court and could have been
considered by it, I am inclined, although dubitante, to conclude with the
Court that we have jurisdiction.
Id. at 307-08.
Justice Rehnquist disagreed, arguing that Chambers did not raise his
constitutional objection in "due time." Mississippi requires contemporaneous objection to evidentiary rulings, including the reasons for the objection.
Id. at 309-10. Justice Rehnquist contended that raising the constitutional
issue in a post-trial motion was too late since it does not afford the trial
court "an opportunity to reconsider his evidentiary ruling in the light of the
constitutional objection."
In the majority opinion, Justice Powell disposed of the jurisdictional
question by noting that petitioner contended that it was the cumulative
effect of the evidentiary rulings that denied him due process, and that
therefore the constitutional question could not have been raised contemporaneously. Id. at 290 n. 3. Justice Powell also pointed out that "no claim
has been made by the State - in its response to the petition for certiorari,
in its brief on the merits, or at oral argument - that the questions are not
properly reviewable by this Court." Id. at 290 n. 3.
101 410 U.S. at 302-03. The Court also refused to hold that the voucher
ruling barring cross-examination of McDonald was in itself sufficient
grounds for reversal, thus further weakening the precedential value of the
confrontation point. Id. at 298.
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The 'voucher' rule, as applied in this case,

with Chambers'
plainly interfered
10 2

right to defend against the

State's charges.

It is quite apparent from Justice Powell's holding that he
regards the "right of confrontation" only as one factor to be
considered in applying a straight due process analysis of whether
the trial had been "fair."' 0 3 Earlier Confrontation Clause
cases are cited, 1 4 but only as support for the general proposition that cross-examination is an important protection for
the accused in a criminal proceeding; no attempt was made by
Justice Powell to apply the specific interpretations of the Sixth

Amendment right set forth in those cases to the situation in
Chambers.
Remarkably, Justice Powell thus managed to convert a
Confrontation Clause problem to one of due process, implicitly
utilizing the Fair Trial Rule advocated by Justice Harlan and
applied by the pre-Warren Court. He also succeeded in limiting
the holding of Chambers to its own facts in the process, for, as
will be seen in the following discussion of the Fair Trial Rule, a
determination that the circumstances of a particular proceeding
rendered it "fair" or "unfair" has slight precedent value for cases
involving a different combination of facts. The facts involved
in Chambers would obviously be hard to duplicate, and there will
consequently be scant opportunity to utilize the Court's holding
in future proceedings.0 5
at 297-98.
The rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call
witnesses in one's own behalf have long been recognized as essential to
due process. . . . Both of these elements of a fair trial are implicated
in the present case.
Id. at 294-95.
104 Id.
at 295; e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) ; Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) ; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) ;
Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972) ; Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314
(1969).
105 The
Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted Chambers as being
essentially limited to its own facts. In People v. Craven, 54 Ill. 2d 419,
299 N.E.2d 1 (1973), the court held that a defense witness could not
testify that a third person had confessed to the homicide for which the defendant was charged. The court noted that the Chambers Court relied on
"objective indicia of trustworthiness regarding the proffered hearsay testiId. at 428, 299 N.E.2d at 6.
"
mony of the three defense witnesses ...
The Illinois court concluded:
In this case the measures of reliability suggested by the Chambers
analysis are not present: the purported statement was heard only by a
woman with whom defendant then lived and is unsupported by independent evidence. Also, in Chambers the third party was available to
testify, while here Lopez remained unapprehended during defendant's
trial. In our opinion, the trial court's determination that the offered
testimony of Mrs. Dawson lacked sufficient threshold reliability to fall
within our limited admission-against-penal-interest hearsay exception
was correct and such testimony was properly withheld from the jury.
Id. at 429, 299 N.E.2d at 6.
Two justices dissented, arguing that the proffered testimony bore marks
of reliability and should have been admitted. Id. at 430-31, 299 N.E.2d at 7.
102
103

Id.
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DUE PROCESS AND THE FAIR TRIAL RULE

As has been seen, the Burger Court's treatment of the right
of confrontation, whether it be the "indicia of reliability" test of
Dutton or the straight "due process" approach of Chambers,
results in practical effect in a rejection of the Confrontation
Clause case law developed by the Warren Court, and in a readoption of the Fair Trial Rule 1 6 utilized by the Court during
the first half of this century. Well before its rejection by the
Warren Court, the Fair Trial Rule had been the subject of considerable criticism, both on constitutional and practical grounds.
The very nature of the rule, which requires that the particular facts of each case be analyzed to see whether the defendant
had received a "fair" trial or not, involved a highly subjective
value judgment by the Court. A summary of some of the tests
used by the pre-Warren Court to determine whether a trial had
been "unfair" illustrates how nebulous such a determination must
be:
[I]t has been said that this Court can forbid state action which
'shocks the conscience' . . . sufficiently to 'shock itself into the
protective arms of the Constitution'. . . It has been urged that
States may not run counter to the 'decencies of civilized conduct'
• . . or 'some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and

conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental' . . . or to
'those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of
justice of English-speaking peoples' . . . or to 'the community's
sense of fair play and decency'. . . .107
Obviously, the application of such tests could only be subjective, despite the protestations of the justices that they were
106 This label was apparently coined by John Raeburn Green in "The
Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Supreme Court," 46
MICH. L. Rnv. 869, 890 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Green].
107 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511-12, n. 4 (1965)
(dissenting opinion by J. Black). See also Justice Cardozo's phrase, "fundamental
principles of liberty and justice," in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
328 (1937).
Interestingly, although Palko has often been cited as authority for the
Fair Trial Rule, it can as readily be read as support for selective incorporation - and was so cited by Justice Black in his dissent in Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 85-86 (1947).
The Fair Trial passage in Palko:
The decision [in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)] did not turn
upon the fact that the benefit of counsel would have been guaranteed
to the defendants by the provisions of the Sixth Amendment if they had
been prosecuted in a federal court. The decision turned upon the fact
that in the particular situation laid before us in the evidence the benefit
of counsel was essential to the substance of a hearing.
Our survey of the cases serves, we think, to justify the statement
that the dividing line between them, if not unfaltering throughout its
course, has been true for the most part to a unifying principle. On
which side of the line the case made out by the appellant has appropriate
location must be the next inquiry and the final one. Is that kind of double
jeopardy to which the statute has subjected him a hardship so acute
and shocking that our polity will not endure it? Does it violate those
'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of
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not relying on their own senses of justice and decency. 08 Justice
Black vehemently condemned the Fair Trial Rule for this reason,
believing that such vague standards endangered both states'
rights and individual liberties and could not be squared with the
Constitution:
There is . . . no express constitutional language granting judicial
power to invalidate [state law] . . . deemed 'unreasonable' or
contrary to the Court's notion of civilized decencies; yet the
constitutional philosophy used by the [pre-Warren Court] majority
has, in the past, been used to deny a state the right to fix the price
of gasoline . . and even the right to prevent bakers from palming
off smaller for larger loaves of bread. . . . These cases, and others,
show the extent to which the evanescent standards of the majority's
philosophy have been used to nullify state legislative programs
passed to suppress evil economic practices. . . . Of even graver
concern, however, is the use of the philosophy to nullify the Bill
of Rights. I long ago concluded that the accordion-like qualities

of this philosophy must inevitably imperil all the individual liberty

09
safeguards specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights.

This was indeed a prophetic warning, as the Burger Court's
all our civil and political institutions?' Hebert v. Louisiana, [272 U.S.
312 (1926) ].
302 U.S. 319, 327-28.
The selective incorporation passages:
[Tihe due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may make it
unlawful for a state to abridge by its statutes the freedom of speech
which the First Amendment safeguards against encroachment by the
Congress . . . or the like freedom of the press . . . or the free exercise
of religion ... or the right of peaceable assembly . . . or the right of
one accused of crime to the benefit of counsel. . . . In these and other
situations immunities that are valid as against the federal government
by force of the specific pledges of particular amendments have been
found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through
the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states.

[These] privileges and immunities . . . have been taken over from
the earlier articles of the federal bill of rights and brought within the
Fourteenth Amendment by a process of absorption. These in their
origin were effective against the federal government alone. If the
Fourteenth Amendment has absorbed them, the process of absorption
has had its source in the belief that neither liberty nor justice would
exist if they were sacrificed.
Id. at 324-26.
108 As Justice Black remarked in his concurring opinion in Rochin' v.
California:
The majority emphasize that these statements do not refer to their own
consciences or to their senses of justice and decency. For we are told
that 'we may not draw on our merely personal and private notions';
our judgment must be grounded on 'considerations deeply rooted in
reason and in the compelling traditions of the legal profession'. . . .
[O]ne may well ask what avenues of investigation are open to
discover 'canons' of conduct so universally favored that this Court
should write them into the Constitution? All we are told is that the
discovery must be made by an 'evaluation based on a disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science on a balanced order of facts.'
342 U.S. 165, 175-76 (1952).
109 Id. at 176-77. Justice Black, while believing that the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights as a whole, supported selective
incorporation as the next best thing. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
171 (1968) (concurring opinion).
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, ten justices of the Supreme Court, including Justice Black,
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treatment of the Sixth Amendment confrontation right demonstrates.
In addition to the constitutional objections to the Fair Trial
Rule voiced by Justice Black and others, the pre-Warren Court
faced severe practical difficulties in its application. The varying
fact situations of each case, added to the inevitably subjective
determination of whether a trial had been "fair" or "unfair,"
resulted in an unevenness of application and created a welter of
conflicting precedents that left the state courts in the awkward
position of having to guess how the Supreme Court would react
to each case. 110 After twenty years of struggling with the Betts v.
Brady"' right-to-counsel version of the Fair Trial Rule, twentytwo states filed an amicus curiae brief in Gideon v. Wainwright,11'
1
urging that Betts be overruled.' 1
The case-by-case approach also made it difficult for the
Court to handle the flood of petitions for certiorari from state
criminal proceedings. 11
Selecting from among them was of
necessity quite arbitrary, since the bulk of them presented the
same legal question - whether the trial in each case was "fair"

or not.
The Warren Court finally abandoned the Fair Trial Rule in
have espoused total incorporation. This view, however, had never commanded a majority. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345-46 (1963)
(separate opinion by J. Douglas).
Selective incorporation, of course, differs significantly from the Fair
Trial Rule, since once a particular guarantee of the Bill of Rights is held to
be incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment there is no longer any basis
for a case-by-case determination of whether the trial as a whole seemed
"fair" or not.
110 Green, supra note 106, at 898.
111316 U.S. 455 (1942).
Betts contains a typical discussion of the

Fair Trial Rule:
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate, as such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth Amendment,
although a denial by a State of rights or privileges specifically embodied
in that and others of the first eight amendments may, in certain circumstances, or in connection with other elements, operate, in a given
case, to deprive a litigant of due process of law in violation of the
Fourteenth. Due process of law is secured against invasion by the
federal Government by the Fifth Amendment, and is safeguarded
against state action in identical words by the Fourteenth. The phrase
formulates a concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged
in other specific and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights. Its
application is less a matter of rule. Asserted denial is to be tested by
an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case. That which may,
in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to
the universal sense of justice, may, in other circumstances, and in the
light of other considerations, fall short of such denial. In the application of such a concept, there is always the danger of falling into the
habit of formulating the guarantee into a set of hard and fast rules,
the application of which in a given case may be to ignore the qualifying factors therein disclosed.
Id. at 461-62.
112372 U.S. 335 (1963).
113 Id. at 336, 345. See A. LEwis, GIDEON'S TRUMPET, 146-50 (1964).
114 Green, supra note 106, at 896-97.
See statistics, id. at 896 n. 120.
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favor of selective incorporation. Beginning in 1961 with Mapp
v. Ohio, 115 the Court 'gradually incorporated in the Fourteenth

Amendment almost all of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights,"'
carrying over the body of federal case law built up in interpretation of those guarantees.' 7 The Court thereby eliminated as
much of the subjective element as possible in its review of state
criminal proceedings, and provided state courts with fairly
explicit and consistent principles by which to judge the constitutionality of their rulings. Thus, contrary to Justice Harlan's

arguments, selective incorporation, in practical effect at least,
actually tended to reduce the strain which the Fair Trial Rule
had placed on the federal system.
A

RETURN TO THE FAIR TRIAL RULE

The constitutional objections and practical difficulties surrounding the Fair Trial Rule have been forgotten, or are being
disregarded, by the Burger Court. The same subjective, caseby-case determinations characteristic of the Fair Trial Rule
are unavoidable under either a Dutton "indicia of reliability"
test or a Chambers "due process" right of confrontation approach, and will doubtless lead to the same problems the pre-

Warren Court experienced with the Fair Trial Rule.
The Burger Court's treatment of the confrontation right
demonstrates most clearly its desire to circumvent the Warren
Court selective incorporation approach to the review of state
proceedings. But that desire - as well as the Court's reliance
on straight "due process" - can also be seen in cases involving
other guarantees of the Bill of Rights, particularly in the opinions of Justices Powell and Rehnquist.
The Right to Counsel
In Argersinger v. Hamlin,"' for instance, Justice Powell,
115 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
116 The following Bill of Rights protections in criminal proceedings have
been incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment and are thus applicable to

the states:

Fourth Amendment, search and seizure: Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643

(1961); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) ; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108 (1964).
Fifth Amendment, double jeopardy: Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784
(1969); Self-incrimination: Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Sixth Amendment, speedy trial: Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213 (1967) ; public trial: In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (by subsequent
interpretation - see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 and n. 10
1968)) ; trial by jury: Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) ; confrontation with witnesses: Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) ; compulsory
process: Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) ; assistance of counsel:
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Eighth Amendment, cruel and unusual punishment: Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
1" The Court held that the guarantees were to be interpreted identically
in state and federal proceedings. See note 135 and acoompanying text, infra.
118 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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joined by Justice Rehnquist, advocated a Betts v. Brady approach
to the problem of providing counsel in non-felony cases. 119 The
majority in Argersinger held that the Gideon right to counsel
extended to all cases where the defendant faced a possible sentence of imprisonment. Justice Powell, in an opinion concurring
in the result, felt that a case-by-case determination based on
"fairness" would have been a more appropriate standard:
I would adhere to the principle of due process that reouires
fundamental fairness in criminal trials, a principle which I believe
encompasses the right to counsel in petty cases whenever the
assistance of counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial.
Due process, perhaps the most fundamental concept in our law,
embodies principles of fairness rather than immutable line drawing as to every aspect of a criminal trial.
I would hold that the right to counsel in petty-offense cases is
not absolute but is one to be determined by the trial courts ex120
ercising a judicial discretion on a case-by-case basis ...
It would be difficult to find a statement more expressive of
the Fair Trial Rule. This opinion, when considered in conjunction with his majority opinion in Chambers, demonstrates that
Justice Powell is clearly anxious to substitute a straight due
process approach for that of selective incorporation.
The Right to a Jury
Impartiality
In Ham v. South Carolina,121 a case involving jury prejudice, Justice Rehnquist substituted a straight "due process"
approach for the Sixth Amendment jury right in much the same
fashion as Justice Powell had substituted it for the confrontation right in Chambers. Justice Rehnquist, in a majority
opinion, held that the trial judge's refusal to question the jury
about possible racial bias at the request of the bearded, black
defendant was a violation of the Due Process Clause. However,
he also held that the refusal to ask questions about possible
prejudice towards persons wearing beards was not a due process
violation. Justice Rehnquist cited the 1873 Slaughter-House
Cases122 in an attempt to rationalize this distinction, stating that:
[S]ince a principle purpose of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to prohibit the States from invidiously discriminating on the basis of race . . . we think that the Fourteenth
Amendment required the judge in this case to interrogate the
jurors upon the subject of racial prejudice ..
While we cannot say that prejudice against people with beards
119 Id. at 65.
120 Id. at 47, 49, 63.
121 409 U.S. 524 (1973).
122 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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might not have been harbored by one or more of the potential jurors in this case. . . . [g]iven the traditionally broad
discretion accorded to the trial judge in conducting voir dire . ..
and our inability to constitutionally distinguish possible prejudice
against beards from a host of other possible similar prejudices,
viowe do not believe the petitioner's constitutional rights12 were
3
lated when the trial judge refused to put this question.

Putting aside the obvious fact that the Due Process Clause
has been greatly extended beyond its initial objective of pro-

tecting "the freedom of the slave race,

' 12 4

the problem in Ham

should more properly have been dealt with under the Sixth
As Witherspoon v. Illinois" -5 made clear, the
Amendment.
Sixth Amendment right to a jury embodies the right to an
impartial jury.126 If Ham had been analyzed in accord with this
rationale, it would have been apparent that no meaningful dis-

tinction can be drawn between racial bias and bias towards
bearded men. The question simply becomes one of whether the
trial judge's refusal to ask the suggested voir dire questions
about potential prejudices violated the right to an impartial
jury.
Unanimity of Verdict
Justice Powell, in addition to his adoption of a straight due
process standard, has also indicated in the companion cases of
2 8
7
that he is willand Apodaca v. Oregon1
Johnson v. Louisiana"2
ing to undercut the basic premise of selective incorporation by
applying a "watered-down" version of the Bill of Rights in state
409 U.S. 524, 526-28.
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 71.
Justices Marshall and Douglas dissented as to that part of the Court's
opinion which held that the trial court's refusal to explore possible bias
towards beards was not constitutional error. Justice Marshall observed:
Long before the Sixth Amendment was made applicable to the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.145 . . .this Court held that the right
to an 'impartial' jury was basic to our system of justice.
123
124

We have never suggested that this right to impartiality and fairness protects against only certain classes of prejudice or extends to only
certain groups in the population. It makes little difference to a criminal
defendant whether the jury has prejudged him because of the color of
his skin or because of the length of his hair. In either event, he has been
deprived of the right to present his case to neutral and detached observers capable of rendering a fair and impartial verdict ...
[T]Te" Court has reversed criminal convictions when the right to query
on voir dire has been unreasonably infringed. . . . Contrary to the
majority's suggestion, these reversals have not been confined to cases
where the defendant was prevented from asking about racial prejudice.
at 531-33.
409 U.S.
125 391 U.S. 510
126 Id. at 518.
tial jury."
127 406 U.S. 356
128 406 U.S. 404

(1968).
The Sixth Amendment, of course, speaks of "an impar(1972).
(1972).
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proceedings. The question in Apodaca was whether the Sixth
Amendment right to trial by jury in criminal cases, which Duncan v. Louisiana1 29 had incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment, included the right to a unanimous verdict. 13 The plurality
decision held that the Sixth Amendment requires a unanimous
verdict in federal courts, but not in state courts - even though
Justice Powell was the sole member of the Court to advocate
that position. This freakish result was reached because four
justices"11 believed the Sixth Amendment did not require a
unanimous verdict in either federal or state courts, and four
justices-3l believed it required a unanimous verdict in both.
Justice Powell broke the deadlock.
In his opinion, Justice Powell acknowledged that it was
"perhaps late in the day for an expression of my views [on
incorporation]11' 3 but went on to say:
I do not think that all of the elements of jury trial within the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment are necessarily embodied in or
incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment .

The question, therefore, that should be addressed in this case is
whether unanimity is in fact so fundamental to the essentials of
jury trial that this particular requirement of the Sixth Amendment is necessarily binding on the States under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
[Alt least in defining the elements of the right to jury trial,
there is no sound basis for interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment
to require blind adherence by the
States to all details of the federal
34
Sixth Amendment standards.'
Justice Douglas, joined in dissent by Justices Brennan and
Marshall, pointed out that all of the incorporated provisions of
the Bill of Rights had already been held to apply in the same
measure to federal and state proceedings." 5 He decried Justice
Powell's position, stating that:
My chief concern is one often expressed by the late Mr.
Justice Black, who was alarmed at the prospect of nine men appointed for life sitting as a superlegislative body to determine
129391 U.S. 145 (1968).
13OJohnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), dealt with the question
of whether there was a due process or enual protection right to a unanimous
verdict, and concluded there was not. The question arose because the trial
had taken place before Duncan was decided, and Duncan had been held not
to be retroactive. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
131 Burger, White, Blackmun and Rehnquist.
132 Douglas, Brennan, Marshall and Stewart.
13 406 U.S. at 375.
134 Id. at 369, 373, 375.
135 Citing as examples Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964);
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) ; Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784, 795 (1969) ; Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967) ; and
the jury right case itself, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 n. 30
(1968); 406 U.S. 356, 383-84.
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whether government has gone too far. The balancing was done
when the Constitution and Bill of Rights were written and adopted.
For this Court to determine, say, whether one person but not
another is entitled to free speech is a power never granted it. But
that is the ultimate reach of decisions that let the States, subject
to our veto, experiment with rights guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights.
I would construe the Sixth Amendment, when applicable to
the States, precisely as I would when applied to the Federal
Government. 36
Thus far Justice Powell seems to be the only member of the
Court willing to espouse a "watered-down" theory of incorporation, but if he can persuade four others to adopt his position
he will have found another method by which to circumvent the
body of case law interpreting the Bill of Rights, just as those
cases were circumvented by the approaches taken in Dutton v.
Evans and Chambers v. Mississippi.
CONCLUSION

The amorphous due process approach taken to constitutional questions in Dutton v. Evans, Chambers v. Mississippi,
Ham v. South Carolina and the Powell opinions in Argersinger
v. Hamlin and Apodaca v. Oregon can easily lead to the
abuses formerly encountered under the Fair Trial Rule. By
simply deciding in any given case that due process had or
had not been violated, the Court could, on the one hand, effectively extend its federal rule-making power to encompass the
state courts. This could result, for example, in the forced
adoption by the states of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence.
Such a use of the Due Process Clause would realize the late
Justice Black's worst fears of interference with states' rights.
On the other hand, it is at least equally possible that the due
process approach will be used to avoid overturning state criminal
convictions that involve violations of the Bill of Rights. In the
less flagrant cases at least, the Court can simply ignore the
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, identify the issue as
one of due process, as it did in Chambers and Ham, and decide
that under the particular circumstances of the case, due process
had not been violated.
If it does so, the Court will once again find itself flooded with
petitions for certiorari from state courts, all presenting the same
basic question of fairness. The subjective, case-by-case approach
of the due process standard will again force state courts to guess
about the constitutionality of their rulings, produce inconsistent
136

406 U.S. at 388.
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holdings, and thus call for increased interference by the Supreme
Court, just as in the pre-Warren years. And such interference
will inevitably place the same strain on federal-state relations
that led twenty-two states to file an amicus curiae brief in Gideon
v. Wainwright in protest of the Fair Trial Rule. Whether such a
strain will be accompanied by more "law and order" is questionable, but it will surely be an ironic by-product of rulings
handed down by those avowed advocates of federalism, the
Nixon appointees.
Kathryn J. Kuhlen

